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eighted Top Candidate method
esearch discipline
a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
We  present  a  novel  algorithm  to rank smaller  academic  entities  such  as  university  depart-
ments or  research  groups  within  a research  discipline.  The  Weighted  Top  Candidate  (WTC)
algorithm  is  a generalisation  of  an expert  identification  method.  The  axiomatic  charac-
terisation  of WTC  shows  why  it is  especially  suitable  for scientometric  purposes.  The  key
axiom  is  stability  – the  selected  institutions  support  each  other’s  membership.  The  WTC
algorithm,  upon  receiving  an  institution  citation  matrix,  produces  a  list  of  institutions  that
can be  deemed  experts  of  the  field.  With  a  parameter  we  can adjust  how  exclusive  our list
should be.  By  completely  relaxing  the  parameter,  we  obtain  the  largest  stable  set  –  aca-
demic  entities  that  can  qualify  as  experts  under  the  mildest  conditions.  With  a strict  setup,
we obtain  a  short  list  of the  absolute  elite.  We  demonstrate  the algorithm  on a  citation
database  compiled  from  game  theoretic  literature  published  between  2008–2017.  By  plot-
ting the  size  of the  stable  sets  with  respect  to  exclusiveness,  we  can  obtain  an  overview  of
the competitiveness  of  the  field.  The  diagram  hints  at how  difficult  it is  for an institution  to
improve its  position.
©  2021  The  Author(s).  Published  by Elsevier  Ltd.  This  is  an open  access  article  under  the
CC  BY  license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
. Introduction
According to a popular idiom, half the money spent on advertising is wasted; the issue is that we don’t know which
alf. Likewise, it is difficult to quantify the efficiency of expenditure on research and education. Despite the well-known
hortcomings of oversimplification and the skewness toward top institutions, university rankings have become increasingly
mportant in the past decades as they offer a way, however inaccurate, to measure performance.
Institutions are seldom consistent in academic quality. Some departments or research groups have more talented staff
hose work gets more recognition than others. Top-performing departments play an important role in an institution’s
uccess as they can provide competitive advantage over similar teaching or research programs due to their reputation. Such
epartments are often able to lobby for additional funding that’s disproportionate to their size. The reallocation of resources
ecessitates performance measurement – the management needs to justify the money spent this way. There might be other
easons why a department or research group needs to be evaluated, such as to provide realistic goals for the staff, justify the
xistence of a newly formed group or assess the additional effort needed to improve its ranking.
University rankings are a measure of performance at the institutional level and are, therefore, unsuitable for measuring
he success of a particular department. One way to resolve this is by evaluating departments based on the performance of the
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ndividual researchers. This may  be problematic as different departments might not be comparable. For instance, a university
f economic studies may  accommodate both health economics and sociology departments. Researchers of the former publish
n completely different journals than the latter, and these outlets usually have a higher impact factor and greater review
peed than those of sociology. Some differences cannot be resolved by normalisation as certain disciplines prefer conference
roceedings or monographs over journal publications. Another problematic issue in individual performance measurement
s the separation of individual contributions from teamwork. Recently, Flores-Szwagrzak and Treibich (2020) proposed a
ethod to disentangle individual productivity from the effect of coauthors.
Another approach is to evaluate departments based on their success in their field of research. For instance, if a computer
cience department mainly conducts research in machine learning, one can look at how the institution performs in that field.
his approach also has some limitations. If a department has fragmented research interests, then the field that encompasses
ll the research areas might be too general, and the resulting ranking will not be significantly different from a university
anking. On the other hand, it may  happen that there are more than one group or department that conduct research in the
ame approximate discipline. We  can amend this by either looking at specific research areas or by evaluating at a higher
evel, although the latter decreases the ranking’s consistency.
In this paper, we rank academic entities (henceforward institutions) based on the field of game theory. The emphasis is
n the methodology rather than on the chosen field. We  use this case study to introduce the Weighted Top Candidate (WTC)
lgorithm – a generalisation of an expert selection method (Sziklai, 2018). This algorithm has several advantages such as a
ound axiomatic foundation with relevant properties,1 visually expressive results that lend itself for interpretation and low
omputational complexity.
The Top Candidate (TC) method originates from the group identification literature and was designed to find expert groups
n recommendation networks. The main component of TC is the so-called stability axiom. Stability asserts that experts are
he most competent individuals to identify other experts. Remarkably, this circular logic can be implemented; in fact, spectral
easures such as PageRank (Page, Brin, Motwani, & Winograd, 1999) and Eigenvector centrality (Bonacich, 1972) are based
n similar concepts.
Stability can be decomposed into two elements: recognition (received citations) and recommendation (given citations).
nly those institutions who are recognised by expert institutions can be deemed experts themselves. On the other hand, if an
nstitution qualifies as expert, it can nominate (choose from the set of institutions they recommend) other experts. Depending
n a parameter, some or all of the recommended institution must belong to the expert group. Parametrisation allows us
o modulate how strict we want to be in our expert selection. Note, that unlike centrality measures group identification
lgorithms do not output a vector of real numbers signifying the importance of the institutions, but a list of institutions that
re deemed important – technically, a vector of zeros (non-experts) and ones (experts). In Section 4, we provide a more
etailed description of our algorithm and its characterisation.
WTC  allows us to uncover the underlying structure of a citation network. If we  set the parameter to be as inclusive as
ossible, we obtain the largest stable set, i.e. those institutions that can be considered experts under the mildest conditions.
he other extreme of fixing the parameter to be as exclusive as possible reveals the core institutions that comprise the top
f the field.
We constructed the citation network from Web  of Science (WoS) data and use direct citations to identify the relevant
apers. The principle behind direct citation is that two papers are related if either of them cites the other. In contrast,
ibliographic coupling and co-citation analysis cluster papers by common documents they refer to or are referred by. We
hus started from a core set of papers that form the main stream of game theoretic literature and looked for related papers.
e required two citations in either direction to establish a connection. In addition, we  also limited the scope of journals to
xclude peripheral branches of the literature.
. Literature overview
Ranking institutions based on their performance in a research discipline has been studied by a number of papers, although
sually from a slightly different perspective.
Abramo and D’Angelo (2015) compared two bibliometric methods to measure the performance of universities – one
ased on the performance of the individual scientists and the other on that of the scientific fields present in the institution.
or the latter, they analysed Italian universities active in nuclear and sub-nuclear physics. Shibata, Kajikawa, Takeda, and
atsushima (2009) investigated the performance of various citation analysis methods for detecting emerging research
ronts. They considered three research domains, gallium nitride, complex networks and carbon nanotubes. They found that
he direct citation method can detect large emerging clusters earlier than bibliographic coupling or co-citation analysis. In
ontrast, Boyack and Klavans (2010) compared the accuracy of cluster solutions using biomedical literature and found direct
itation to be the least accurate mapping method. In this paper, we do not take sides in the debate; rather, we note that the
eiden University ranking also uses direct citations to define micro-fields (Waltman & van Eck, 2012). Dusansky and Vernon
1998) evaluate eight rankings of U.S. economics departments using four differing methodologies. They assess the strengths
1 There are a few papers that offer axiomatic characterisations of centrality measures but the underlying properties are not always meaningful from the
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nd weaknesses of the various approaches of which two  is based on publications by faculty and two  on faculty surveys.
lma, Coş kun, & Övendireli, 2016 propose a field based ranking framework for Turkish Universities. The study’s goal is to
evelop a set of indicators by integrating different perspectives on performance. They argue that general ranking lists might
ot paint a realistic picture, thus they focus on country specific circumstances.
Perhaps the closest to our work are that of Zachos (1991), Lazaridis (2010) and Laengle, Merigó, Modak, Modak, and Yang
2020). Zachos (1991) compared the mathematics department of two  Greek universities. He also considered a 10 year time
eriod, but used only basic scientometric indicators. Lazaridis (2010) used the h-index to rank university departments. He
lso argued that ranking departments gives a higher resolution picture of the distribution of quality within each university
nd could provide a strong motive for meritocratic hiring practices. Laengle et al. (2020) identify the most productive and
nfluential research institutions in Operations Research and Management Science by taking into account the most influential
ournals.
University rankings often use complex score systems in which research excellence is but one factor. Centrality measures
uch as PageRank (Page et al., 1999) were suggested for citation analysis purposes (Ma,  Guan, & Zhao, 2008). The Scimago
ournal Rank (SJR) indicator is also a variant of PageRank (Guerrero-Bote & Moya-Anegón, 2012). The Eigenfactor project,2
eveloped by West, Bergstrom, and Bergstrom (2010), is based upon another spectral centrality measure, the Eigenvector
entrality (Bonacich, 1972). In this paper, we employ an expert selection method developed by Sziklai (2018). The idea of
he algorithm originates from the group identification problem established in the seminal paper of Kasher and Rubinstein
1997).
Further, there are a few papers that focus on axiomatic study of bibliometric indices and methods. Marchant (2009) have
resented an axiomatic characterisation of popular rankings, including the h-index. Altman and Tennenholtz (2010) studied
ersonalised ranking systems and trust systems. They adapt several axioms from the literature on global ranking systems
nd fully classify the set of systems that satisfy all of these axioms. Bouyssou and Marchant (2016) characterised fractionally
ounting citations that were suggested as a possible way to normalise citation counts between fields of research. Wąs and
kibski (2018a, 2018b) characterized the most popular spectral measures including PageRank and Eigenvector centrality.
. Data
We  constructed a citation network by identifying relevant papers of the research field and then extracting the institution
ross-referencing data from this set. We  looked at a 10-year period, from 2008 to 2017.
Game theory is a highly diverse field. Research directions extend to microeconomics, social choice and mechanism design,
mong others. Various branches of the discipline, such as evolutionary and combinatorial game theory, address completely
ifferent questions, and the related papers published on various platforms share no common reader base. Consequently,
hen assessing game theoretical research, we may  commit two  types of errors – either we include too much such as journals
nd papers that fall outside the main stream of game theoretical research or we  include too little and miss key parts of the
iterature. There is no single best way to construct a citation network of a scientific discipline. What we opt for in this paper
s a pragmatic approach. First, we identified two journals that play a central role in this field: Games and Economic Behavior
GEB) and International Journal of Game Theory (IJGT). These two journals compose the core of our citation database. Both
ournals are well-known and highly respected outlets among researchers of the field. There are others that focus mainly on
ame theoretical research, including International Game Theory Review, Dynamic Games and Applications, Mathematical
ocial Sciences, Social Choice and Welfare and MDPI Games. The reasons why we kept the core relatively small is that the
wo chosen journals
 are the (only) official journals of the Game Theory Society.3
 publish solely game theoretical research.
The core contains only a fraction of the game theoretical literature. The other parts are scattered in numerous journals
hat belong to different fields. Adding more journals to the core of our database would undermine its integrity as these
ournals’ scope is typically not restricted to game theory. We  decided to define the missing parts in relation with the core.
e constructed two sets: the Ancestor and Descendant set which contain papers from relevant journals.
A journal is considered relevant if it cites and is cited by the core at least 10 times. In other words, the set of articles
ublished by a journal during the 10-year time frame should refer the papers in the core at least 10 times in total. In
ddition, the papers in the core should refer the papers published by the journal at least 10 times in total. The logical ‘and’
uarantees that the journal is part of the discourse and that it is not one-sided communication. There were also exceptions;
or instance, International Game Theory Review was  not cited enough times by GEB and IJGT, but since the papers published
here are relevant, we decided to include the journal in the analysis. Similarly, some journals of mathematical nature were
dded to the relevant set, although they didn’t qualify by the threshold.
2 eigenfactor.org
3 The Society as the organiser of the World Congress, is a central institute of game theoretical research.
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Fig. 1. Data aggregation, procession and network design.
We  found 421 journals that cited or were cited by the core at least twice. Although the 10 papers inclusion criterion seems
o be relatively lax, only 33 among the 421 journals satisfied it. Based on the journals’ scope, we identified 24 additional
ournals that were potentially relevant. We  added 19 of them based on their content – mainly by the published papers’ titles
nd abstracts. In total, 3804 articles published in 52 different journals were considered.
A paper qualified for the Ancestor set if it was obtained from a relevant journal and cited at least two distinct papers in the
ore. Similarly, a paper qualified for the Descendant set if it was  from a relevant journal and is cited by at least two distinct
apers from the core. The top part of Fig. 1 describes the process. The Ancestor, Core and Descendant sets contained 1185,
730 and 889 papers respectively.
Having identified the admissible papers, we were now ready to construct the institution citation network. Our aim was  to
reate a weighted directed graph, wherein the nodes represent institutions and arc weights represent the number of times
he source institution cited the sink institution. There is more than one sensible way  for how this can be done. Suppose
 paper written by two authors from Institute A cites a paper written by an author affiliated to Institute B. Should this be
ounted as one or two references? A similar question arises when an author from Institute A cites a paper written by two
uthors affiliated with Institute B.
We decided that irrespective of the number of authors from the same institution on either of the citing or the cited
aper, one citation should increase an edge weight only by 1. However, one citation can increment more than one edge
eights if there were more than one institutions involved in one of the papers. The middle part of Fig. 1 demonstrates the
alculation. Note that only those citations were considered where both the citing and the cited paper was a member of either
he Ancestor, the Descendant or the Core set. References citing non-game theoretical papers were discarded.
As a final step, we had to decide whether to keep self-citations or not. Researchers commonly cite their own  works, so
arger departments will tend to produce more self-citations entirely by their size. On the other hand, removing self-citations
ould harm more productive researchers. In addition, self-citation on an institution level does not imply that there is a
elf-citing author as the citation can come from a colleague of the same institute. Although we opted to keep self-citations,
e note that removing them would have also been a valid choice. The drawback of keeping them is that we had to prune
he data: an institutions that only cites itself forms a stable component, thus WTC  identifies it as an expert (cf. Section 4).
ortunately, such anomalies are rare, and in our citation network we only found one such institution at the periphery of the
etwork. While pruning, we removed its self-citing edge.
The final network constituted 1,002 nodes (institutions) and 23,725 directed edges (references) with a total weight of
1,919.We had to make a few choices in determining the relevant set of papers. Arguably, the design could be improved. There
as a trade-off between the sophistication of the clustering mechanism and efficiency. Direct citation could be replaced by
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o the micro-field no. #1111 of the Leiden ranking.4 Both the journals (GEB, IJGT, Math. Soc. Sci., Soc. Choice and Welf., Lect.
otes in Comp. Sci.) and the keywords (core, shapley value, strategy proofness, cooperative game, judgement aggregation)
isted to this micro-field seem to be highly relevant to our targeted set of papers. In comparison, micro-fields no. #1716
nd #2833, which are centered around auctions and traffic routing respectively, seemed to show some overlap in journals
nd keywords as game theorists contributed to both fields significantly. As we  said earlier, classification is rather fluid and
etermining what constitutes as mainstream game theoretical research is a matter of taste. Our aim in this paper is to
emonstrate the advantages of the Weighted Top Candidate algorithm, thus we content ourselves with the obtained set.
. The Weighted Top Candidate algorithm
Some rankings can be constructed on an objective criteria. We can organise competitions to determine who  is the best
hess player. Beauty contests, on the other hand, are highly subjective and the results express trends and people’s preferences
ather than the objective truth. In between these two extremes are questions that cannot be decided by competitions and
re not even entirely subjective. “Who is the best game theorist?” is one such question. In general, expert identification falls
nto this category.
We  aim to use institution cross-referencing data to uncover the most prestigious institutions in the field of game theory.
he WTC  algorithm allows institutions to nominate one or more institutions into the expert set. In the beginning, every
nstitution is part of the set, and then we iteratively remove those who  are not nominated by anyone from within the set.
he key assumption is that nominations are not equally valuable, and experts are much more efficient in recognising other
xperts. Analogously, getting cited by a Nobel-prize winning researcher in a top journal is worth more than getting cited by
 PhD student in a second-rate journal. Note that this is not a judgement on the student or the journal – they just might be
t the beginning of their journey.
In this section, we make use the following notations. The institution citation network is represented by a directed graph,
 = (V, E), where V denotes the set of institutions (nodes) and E denotes the set of references (directed edges) between
nstitutions. Each reference e = (u, v) has a weight we ∈ N  that represents the number of times Institution u cited Institution
. This also implies that there are no parallel edges; however, loops (self-referencing institutions) are possible. Let R(v)
enote the set of institutions referred by v, that is R(v) = {u ∈ V| ∃ (v, u) ∈ E}. Let L(v) denote the set of references given by v.
he reputation of an institution is the total number of citations it receives, formally rv =
∑
{e ∈ E|e=(u,v)}we. The top candidate
f an institution v is the most reputable institution it refers to; that is, the institution u which has the highest ru value among
nstitutions that are cited by v. We  denote by ωv the weight of the top candidate of institution v, formally ωv = max {u ∈ R(v)}ru.
Alternatively, we can consider an institution citation matrix [aij]n×n, where n denotes the number of institutions and aij




lgorithm 1. Weighted Top Candidate method
: N ←− V, Z ←− ∅ , b = true // Initialisation
:  while b do
: for all v ∈ N do
: for all (v, u) ∈ L(v) do
:  if ωv(1 − ˛) ≤ ru then
: Z ←− u // if u is nominated, put it in Z
:  end if
: end for
: end for
0: if N = = Z then
1: b = false // if everyone in N was nominated, we stop
2:  else
3: N = Z, Z =∅ // otherwise we continue with the nominated agents




The Weighted Top Candidate algorithm operates on a set N, which in the beginning contains all the institutions. With
ach iteration, the algorithm discards institutions that are not nominated by anyone in N. Nomination is controlled by a
arameter ˛: Each institution u nominates (in terms of reputation) the top  ̨ fraction of the institutions that it cites (let us
all these ˛-top candidates of u). The obtained set – which might be the empty set – is stable in the sense that each institution
s nominated (vouched for) by some institution in the set. For a formal description see Algorithm 1.
4 Information on the micro-fields of the Leiden Ranking is available in an Excel file downloadable from
ttps://www.leidenranking.com/information/fields.
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ponding institution. Circles with broken lines signify that the institution was not nominated in the previous iteration.
.2. Example
Fig. 2 shows a simple example of the WTC  algorithm with  ̨ = 0.8. Institution a nominates c and d. The former because it
s the most reputable cited institution of a, the latter because
ωa · (1 − ˛) ≤ r(d) thatis30 · 0.8 ≤ 25.
Similarly, b and f also nominates two other institutions. Institutions c, d and e have only one candidate. In the second
teration, b and e are discarded from the set of experts as they are not nominated by anyone. As a consequence, their
ominations are cancelled. Note that only the nominations of b and e are removed from the network, the nodes themselves
re not. Thus, the reputations are unaffected and the remaining institutions still nominate the same agents. Since institutions
 and f are not nominated by anyone, they are removed from the expert set in the third iteration. The remaining two
nstitutions c and d nominate each other, thus they form a stable component. If we increase  ̨ to 0.4, f also becomes a
ember of the expert set as c nominates it besides d. At this level of exclusivity, e also nominates b but to no avail: e cannot
ecome part of any stable component since it is not nominated by anyone at any level of ˛.
.2.1. Characterisation
WTC  is characterised by three appealing properties: stability, exhaustiveness and decisiveness. Here, we only describe
he axioms informatively. Definition and a formal proof of the non-weighted case can be found in (Sziklai, 2018). The
haracterization carries over to the weighted case in a straightforward manner.
Stability requires that (i) each expert should be nominated by an expert and (ii) the nominees of each expert should belong to
he expert set.
Note that different nomination processes produce different stability notions. Institutions in the WTC  algorithm nominate
heir ˛-top candidates, i.e.  ̨ fraction of the most prestigious institutions among the ones they cite. Thus, WTC  is stable with
espect to the ˛-top candidate relation.
Exhaustiveness implies that the algorithm identifies every relevant institution. Suppose some members of the network cannot
e elected, e.g., due to conflict of interest. An exhaustive algorithm cannot find new experts when the previously selected institutions
re marked as non-elective and we re-run the algorithm.
An algorithm that always returns the empty set is both stable and exhaustive. Thus, we  need some kind of existence
xiom to ensure that the algorithm selects somebody when there are reasonable candidates.
Decisiveness is a guarantee that the algorithm selects somebody when there exists at least one elective institution of a set that
s stable with respect to the nomination process.
A group identification method takes a weighted directed network (or a citation matrix) as input and outputs a list of
odes (rows/columns).
heorem 1. A group identification method is stable with respect to the ˛-top candidate relation, exhaustive and decisive with
espect to the ˛-top candidate relation, if and only if it is the Weighted Top Candidate method.
A proof follows word by word the non-weighted case, see (Sziklai, 2018). One way to see this is to reduce the problem to
he non-weighted case by representing the weighted edges with parallel edges. This is always possible since weights in our
odel are positive integers.
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ig. 3. The difference between k-core and WTC. Each edge weight is set to 1. Colored circles represent the institutions chosen by WTC, while circles with
roken  lines represent the institutions that belong to the k-core for k = 3.
. Benchmark methods
We  calculated four alternative measures to serve as comparative benchmarks. Despite its simplicity, degree centrality
as proven to be a very good indicator of performance. Here, we  calculated the weighted in-degree of the nodes, that is, the
eputation of the corresponding institutions.
Harmonic centrality was proposed by Marchiori and Latora (2000) to overcome the limitations of Closeness centrality.
armonic centrality of a node, v is the sum the reciprocal of distances between v and every other node in the network. For
isconnected node pairs, the distance is defined as zero. If a node lies on the periphery, then the distances from most of the
ther nodes will be large. Thus, the reciprocal of the distances will be small, yielding a small centrality value. In directed
etworks, it is often more meaningful to work with a graph where the direction of the edges is reversed (if there are many
aths leading to a node, then it lies in the center irrespective of how many path begins from that node). Consequently, we
eversed the edges when we computed Harmonic centrality.
PageRank is a spectral measure that models an infinite random walk. The PageRank scores indicate how likely it is that
he walker occupies a certain node. In our setting, this translates to browsing the game theoretical literature, jumping from
ne paper to another in a random manner and asking what the probability is that the next paper is written by someone
rom a given institution. However, a simple random walk entails the following problem: what do we  do with sink nodes
institutions that do not cite anybody) or when the walk enters an inescapable component of the graph (when we enter
nto a group of institutions that cite only themselves)? To amend this, PageRank connects sink nodes with every other
ode through a link and redistributes some value uniformly in each iteration. The latter is parameterised by the so-called
damping factor’ d ∈ (0, 1). The damping factor is most commonly chosen from the interval (0.7, 0.9); here, we  opted for
 = 0.8. PageRank is a core element of Google’s search engine, but the algorithm is used in a wide variety of applications. In
articular, the Scimago Journal Rank (SJR) indicator is also based on PageRank (Guerrero-Bote & Moya-Anegón, 2012).
k-core, also known as k-shell, exposes the onion-like structure of the network (Kitsak et al., 2010; Seidman, 1983). First, it
uccessively removes institutions that were only cited by one or less institution in the network. These are assigned a k-core
alue of 1. Then it removes institutions with two or less citing institutions and labels them with a k-core value of 2. The
rocess continues until every node is classified. The definition of k-core and its variants resemble to that of WTC, however,
s Fig. 3 highlights they are not the same. Suppose we  would like to determine the k-core of this network for k = 3. The
upporters of Institution u – with the exception of Institution v – are removed one by one. Eventually Institution u is also
emoved. In the WTC  computation, no Institution or citation is discarded. Non-expert institutions only lose their ability to
ominate. As a result, Institution u is also deemed as an expert. It would be interesting to see whether there is a nomination
rocess under which k-core is stable.5
The k-core method was developed for non-weighted networks. There is more than one way how this procedure can be
eneralised to weighted networks. We  follow Garas, Schweitzer, and Havlin (2012)’s suggestion and compute the so-called
eighted k-shell,  which instead of the number of citing institutions considers the square root of the product of the number
f citing institutes and the total number of citations received by the institute. For example, if Institution a is cited once by
nstitution b and twice by Institution c, then the weight of Institution a is
√
2 · (1 + 2) =
√
6. In comparison, if Institution receives 3 citation from one source it obtains a weight of
√
3. That is, the Weighted k-shell method favours institutions
hose citations come from diverse sources.
5 Note that, majority voting is not stable for any nomination process (Sziklai, 2018).
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ig. 4. The steep mountain of academic excellence. As we relax the exclusiveness parameter more and more institutions are selected by the WTC  algorithm.
. Results
The output of the WTC  algorithm is a set of experts. This set is stable, thus the membership of each institution is endorsed
y someone from the set. By a parameter, we can adjust how exclusive the list of experts should be. To obtain a complete
icture, we ran WTC  under 101 different parameter setting from 0 to 1 with an increment of 1 percent point.
Under the most relaxed setting (  ̨ = 1), we obtain the largest stable set – those institutions that can be considered as
xperts in any sense. Already, 28% of the institutions drop out. We  cannot enlarge the expert set in such a way that each
ember receives a nomination from within the set. The other extreme (  ̨ = 0) is occupied by one institute. Stanford forms
 stable set in itself because it nominates only itself under this parameter setting. Exclusiveness has to drop an astounding
5% to include another institution. Even at (  ̨ = 0.41), only 1% of the institutions belong to the set of experts. If we  plot the
raction of institutions with respect to ˛, an incredibly steep mountain starts to shape (see Fig. 4).
Corvinus University of Budapest – home affiliation of the author – features a Mathematical and Statistical Institute where
ame theoretical research is traditionally strong. According to the ranking by the WTC  analysis, the university is ranked
round the top 25%. With some additional effort and aimed recruitment, it could certainly get into the top 20%. Incidentally,
etting into the top 200 institutions in global rankings is a dedicated goal of the recent reforms that were initiated at Corvinus.
However, further improving the university’s position seems difficult. The slope of the curve starts to increase dramatically
round 15%. The top 5% is like a vertical wall, a tiny advancement would need a significant rise in received citations. It would
e interesting to see whether other disciplines have a similar WTC  curve.
Tables 1 and 2 compare the WTC  ranking to some benchmark rankings induced by well-known centralities. Table 1 lists
he top 11 institutions.6 With the exception of Harmonic centrality the top positions of the rankings largely overlap with
ach other, indicating that there is a consensus between the measures. Considering the differences between the number of
eceived citations, this is hardly surprising.
To obtain a complete picture, we also calculated the distances between the rankings of the expert institutions. Table 2
isplays the normalized sum of ranking differences (nSRD) between the rankings. The nSRD score is the Manhattan distance
ivided by the maximum possible distance between two rankings, thus the values range from 0 to 1. Here the ranking’s size
s 722 as this many institutions belong to the stable set. Note that the expected distance between two  random rankings of
6 For  ̨ = 0.40 there are only four institution in the expert set. Increasing the parameter by one point adds seven more institutions. This can be interpreted
s  a seven-way tie for the fifth place. Since WTC  outputs a zero-one vector for every parameter setting, ties are common.
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Table 1
Top academic research centers in game theory according to the Weighted Top Candidate algorithm and their ranking according to different centralities. In











Stanford Univ 1 1 1 49 1
CALTECH 2 2 3 7 2
Northwestern Univ 3 3 2 3 3.5
Harvard Univ 4 4 4 41 3.5
Chapman Univ 8 11 32 117 11
Columbia Univ 8 5 6 23 5
NYU  8 10 7 27 9
Univ  Autonoma Barcelona &GSE 8 8 9 11 10
Univ  Bonn 8 7 8 2 7
Univ  Calif San Diego 8 9 5 24 7
Univ  Maastricht 8 6 13 1 7
Table 2



























his size follows approximately normal distribution with mean 0.66 and std. deviation of 0.016. Even Harmonic centrality
 which seems to be a little bit farther from the others – is very close according to this metric. The smallest distance is
isplayed between Degree and Weighted k-shell, while WTC  and Harmonic centrality are the farthest away from each other.
or more details about the SRD statistics the reader is referred to (Héberger, 2010; Héberger & Kollár-Hunek, 2011; Sziklai
 Héberger, 2020).
. Discussion
Let us address a few issues regarding the applied methodology.
We proposed a framework to rank academic entities within a discipline without specifying what we mean by the latter.
he Journal of Economic Literature developed a classification system (JEL) to categorize scholarly literature in the field
f economics.7 JEL distinguishes 20 general categories denoted with letters from (A) to (Z). Game Theory and Bargaining
heory (C7) falls under Category (C): Mathematical and Quantitative Methods. Although our database contains JEL codes
nly sporadically, when it does, the (C) category label almost always accompanied by some other tags among which the
ost common is (D): Microeconomics, more specifically, (D7): Analysis of Collective Decision-Making. According to the JEL
ystem, game theory is a mid-level category. It is too general to be completely described by some 3 letter tags, but not general
nough to be a main category in itself.
The proposed method can be applied at any level of the classification hierarchy, however, there is a trade-off between the
ccuracy of the ranking and its coverage. For example, it would be much simpler to compile a comprehensive dataset about
ooperative Games (C71). As soon as we aim higher, though, less related papers start to creep in.8 A broad view probably
ncorporates the research of every game theorist but also finds an increasing amount of less related literature. Thus, as we
ove from specific to general, we lose our descriptive power: the ranking converges to the general university ranking of the
eld.
Creating a core set of key journals is not always possible, but fortunately isn’t necessary either. There are more than one
ay to identify the papers that belong to a discipline. One advantage of this method (at least for the topic of game theory) is
hat it makes the choice of the source (WoS vs Scopus) an insignificant matter. Among the relevant set of journals that we
xtracted from WoS  there is only one that is not featured by Scopus: the proceedings series of the Symposium on Algorithmic
ame Theory (SAGT) with a total of 16 papers. Although Scopus covers more journals than WoS  (Mongeon & Paul-Hus, 2016),
e expect that the relevant set of journals are more or less the same in both databases due to the threshold requirement.
orres-Salinas, Lopez-Cózar, and Jiménez-Contreras (2009) find that the works that had published by the University of
7 https://www.aeaweb.org/jel/guide/jel.php
8 According to Microsoft Academic, the most relevant journal paper on the topic of game theory, at the time of writing, is a paper about smart grids
Mohsenian-Rad, Wong, Jatskevich, Schober, & Leon-Garcia, 2010), which might be an important paper but hardly can be categorized as a mainstream
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avarra in Scopus that are not indexed by Web  of Science receive much less citation (nearly 1/5) on average than the works
hat are indexed in both. Thus, such works are unlikely to survive when we filter for relevant journals. English-language
ournals are overrepresented in WoS, but for the same reason we do not expect that the language bias affects the results.
In our model each citation carried the same weight. The literature suggests many improvements over the simple citation
ount. The location and intensity of citations as well as the context (cf. negative citations) matters (Aksnes, Langfeldt, &
outers, 2019; Catalini, Lacetera, & Oettl, 2015; Maričić, Spaventi, Pavičić, & Pifat-Mrzljak, 1998). It would be also interesting
o weigh citations based on the quality of the journal the citing paper was published in.
. Conclusion
University rankings hide the heterogeneity of the faculty. Successful departments and research groups can put a face
ehind the university’s logo and boost their reputation. Measuring the performance of departments has many advantages,
ut the problem is as difficult as desirable. Ranking departments by evaluating individual researchers can run into the
pples-and-oranges fallacy. Successful departments are often organised around a research topic, thus we can measure their
erformance by looking at how they are ranked within the discipline the topic belongs to.
In this paper, we introduced a novel method for ranking institutions within a research discipline. The Weighted Top
andidate method is a generalisation of an expert selection method. It relies on a simple observation: experts are much
ore effective in identifying other experts. Consequently, the selected set must be stable: (i) the expert institutions must
upport each other’s membership and (ii) whenever an institution is deemed expert, its recommendation carries weight;
hat is, it can nominate other experts. WTC  has other advantages beside its axiomatic characterisation. Centrality measures
utput a real vector, while WTC  outputs a list of experts. While at first glance this might seem like a restriction, it enables us
o point out which institutions do not belong to the expert set. The WTC  can and does output the empty set if there are no
ensible agents that can be called experts. Even if the algorithm finds experts, the largest stable set is usually significantly
maller than the whole set. In contrast, centrality measures such as PageRank will quantify every node, and just by looking
t the numbers, we will not be able to notice the quality difference between an expert and a non-expert node.
The output of WTC  has an expressive representation. With a parameter, we can adjust how exclusive our list of expert
hould be. Plotting the size of the stable sets with respect to the exclusiveness parameter reveals the competitiveness of the
nalysed field. Simple rankings only reveal the current position of an institution, while Fig. 4 also hints at how difficult it is
o improve this position.
The difficulty of applying WTC  comes from collecting suitable data. It would be interesting to look at more sophisticated
atabases that describe research disciplines. In particular, using the micro-field classification of the Leiden ranking, we  could
ompare the fierceness of the competition in different scientific disciplines.
Finally, let us note that WTC  is a general expert selection method, which is suitable but not limited to ranking institutions.
epending on the underlying data it can rank authors or journals just as well.
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